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Profitability of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe: 





Using data for 265 banks in Central and Eastern European Countries for the period of 
1995-2003, this paper analyses the differences in profitability between domestic and for-
eign banks. We show that foreign banks, especially greenfield institutions, earn higher 
profits than domestic banks. However, this effect is acquired rather than inherited, since 
there is evidence that foreign banks tend to take over less profitable institutions. Profits of 
foreign banks in CEECs also exceed profits of their parent banks, explaining the reasons 
for their entry. Further, we study benefits and costs of foreign ownership by analyzing de-
terminants of profitability for domestic, takeover, and greenfield banks. Profits of foreign 
banks are less affected by macroeconomic conditions in their host countries. However, 
greenfield banks are sensitive to the situation of their parent banks. Only domestic banks 
enjoy higher profits in more concentrated banking markets, whereas takeover banks suffer 
from diseconomies of scale due to the fact that they acquired large institutions. 
 
JEL classification: G15, G21, F36 
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Profitability of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe: 





Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan koti- ja ulkomaisten pankkien kannattavuutta Keski- ja 
Itä-Euroopassa. Tutkimuksessa käytetään tilastotietoa 265 pankista vuosina 1995–2003. 
Tuloksien mukaan ulkomaiset pankit ovat kannattavampia, erityisesti jos pankki on ulko-
maisen sijoittajan perustama. Tämä havainto voidaan kuitenkin selittää osaksi siten, että 
jos ulkomaiset pankit ostavat kotimaisia pankkeja, ne ostavat erityisesti vähemmän kannat-
tavia pankkeja. Keski- ja Itä-Euroopan tytärpankkien kannattavuus on parempi kuin niiden 
ulkomaisten emopankkien, mikä selittää näiden maiden houkuttelevuuden sijoituskoht-
eena. Työssä analysoidaan myös ulkomaisen omistuksen etuja ja haittoja selvittämällä, 
mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat kannattavuuteen kotimaisissa, ulkomaalaisten ostamissa ja ulko-
maalaisten perustamissa pankeissa. Makrotaloudelliset tekijät vaikuttavat vähemmän 
ulkomaisten pankkien kannattavuuteen, mutta ulkomaalaisten perustamien pankkien tulok-
seen vaikuttaa niiden emopankkien tuloskunto. Jos pankkisektori on keskittynyt, kotimai-
set pankit ovat kannattavampia. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The literature on determinants of bank profitability is very extensive. However, the major-
ity of papers focus on markets with a low presence of foreign banks. Furthermore, they ig-
nore two facts: first, that foreign banks might be differently affected by certain factors than 
domestic banks would, and, second, that they can be affected by additional factors, such as 
home country conditions and strategies of their parent institutions. The only study that ad-
dresses this issue is the work of Williams (1998a, 1998b, 2003), who constructs an empiri-
cal model of foreign banks’ profit determinants and tests a number of hypotheses concern-
ing profitability of foreign banks in Australia. The results show that domestic factors do 
not add a great deal of descriptive power to the model, albeit they offer important insights 
into foreign banks' strategic and policy decisions (Williams, 2003). 
Theoretically, foreign banks’ profits can be affected by business conditions in their 
home countries and by their parents’ health or a change in the latters’ strategy. These can 
entail both costs and benefits for banking industries in CEECs. The biggest advantage of 
foreign ownership is the smaller sensitivity of foreign banks to host country conditions and 
significantly better access to international markets. International experience also indicates 
that parent banks serve as lenders-of-last-resort if their subsidiaries run into trouble. For 
example, the Belgian bank KBC recapitalized its Polish subsidiary Kredyt Bank and its 
Hungarian subsidiary K&H when they encountered problems. As regards Kredyt Bank, the 
problems stemmed from rapid loan growth that led to a large volume of non-performing 
loans, whereas the problems of  K&H were caused by fraudulent management activities. 
At the same time, foreign banks may be influenced by poor performance or strategy 
changes by their parent banks. There are two main channels here that are worth consider-
ing. First, a foreign bank may be liquidated if the parent bank experiences problems and 
decides to close some of its subsidiaries. A recent example of an impact of parent bank 
problems on foreign banks operating in CEECs was the withdrawal of Dresdner Bank from 
Romania and the Czech Republic, which was apparently linked to Dresdner's problems at 
the headquarters. Second, managers of international banks admit to allocating capital to 
subsidiaries with the highest expected returns (de Haas & Naaborg, 2005). Therefore, even 
a profitable foreign subsidiary could be closed in order to reallocate capital to even more 
profitable project in another country.  
 Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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The impact of home country conditions on foreign banks is more ambiguous and 
cannot be easily predicted. Let us assume, for example, that the home country experiences 
an economic upswing. In this situation parent banks may have numerous profitable oppor-
tunities in their home countries and may decide to allocate less capital to their subsidiaries. 
At the same time, robust growth in the home country could render parent banks more prof-
itable and better able to develop their subsidiaries abroad. The situation would be the re-
verse in an economic slowdown in the home country, as parent banks may decide to either 
cut their foreign operations – due to low profits at home – or expand abroad in search of 
new opportunities.  
Apart from economic environment at host and home countries, other factors could 
have a differential impact on foreign and domestic banks. The increase in foreign bank 
ownership in CEECs went hand in hand with the rise in banking market concentration. 
Foreign banks contributed to higher concentration of banking markets through two chan-
nels: 1) foreign banks acquired a few domestic institutions and merged them into one; 2) 
domestic institutions consolidated because of competitive pressures from foreign peers. It 
would be interesting, therefore, to investigate whether domestic and foreign banks react 
differently to the changing structure of the market. In addition, stock markets developed 
considerably in CEECs, providing firms with alternative sources of funds. Since foreign 
banks are often accused of servicing only large enterprises, we can expect that profits of 
foreign banks decrease when stock markets develop. 
In light of the above discussion this paper attempts to answer the following ques-
tions: Did foreign banks acquire more or less profitable institutions in CEECs? Are foreign 
and domestic banks affected in the same way by macroeconomic conditions in their host 
countries? Are foreign banks sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in their home coun-
tries and to parent banks’ financial situation? Does market concentration in host countries 
have the same impact on foreign as on domestic banks? How does the development of 
stock markets affect profits of foreign and domestic banks? 
It should be mentioned that in this study we expressly consider the entry mode of 
foreign banks, that is we differentiate between foreign banks that have taken over existing 
institutions (takeover banks) and those that have established new institutions (greenfield 
banks). This distinction is very important because there are pronounced differences in the 
strategies pursued by these banks. Greenfield banks traditionally service large international 
corporations and thus they could be more influenced by home country conditions and par-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/ 2006 
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ent banks’ financial situation as compared to takeover banks, which are more oriented to 
domestic retail markets. 
The present paper investigates the determinants of banks’ profitability using a data-
set comprising 265 banks from 10 CEECs (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) between 1995-2003. 
Since our interest lies in the profitability determinants of banks with different ownership, 
we estimate regressions for the whole sample and separately for the domestic, foreign, 
takeover, and greenfield banks. In order to gain insight into the factors that affect the prof-
itability of banks in CEECs, we investigate the relationship between banks’ return on as-
sets and indicators of  individual banks’ characteristics, host country macroeconomic con-
ditions, stock market capitalization, banking market concentration, parent banks’ perform-
ance, and home country macroeconomic conditions. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, in our analysis of 
profitability we clearly differentiate between greenfield and takeover institutions. Second, 
we assume that foreign and domestic banks can react differently to the same profitability 
determinants, such as domestic macroeconomic conditions, market structure, and level of 
banking sector development. Therefore, we construct separate econometric models for do-
mestic, greenfield and takeover banks. Finally, we focus on transition countries and test a 
number of hypotheses that have been previously tested for developed countries but might 
yield different results for CEECs. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a short review of cir-
cumstances under which foreign banks entered CEECs. In Section 3 we give a literature 
overview. Section 4 shows data sources and descriptive statistics. Sections 5 and 6 present 
econometric methodology and empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2  Entry of foreign banks into the banking sectors of CEECs 
 
The banking sectors in CEECs are characterized by very high levels of foreign presence. In 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia foreign banks control more than 80% of total 
banking capital. The largest five foreign owners in CEECs are KBC Bank, Erste Bank, 
HVB Group, Société Générale and Unicredito Italiano (Table 1). It is easy to notice some 
regional specialization among foreign banks. Large Scandinavian banks (Swedbank and Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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Skandinavska Enskilda) virtually monopolize the banking markets of the Baltic states, and 
Greek banks (National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, Emporiki Bank of 
Greece) have a foothold only in the Balkan countries. At the same time, Austrian banks 
(Erste Bank, HVB Group
1, Raiffeisen) control large shares of banking assets in all CEECs, 
except for the Baltic states. There are also a few examples when CEE banks have stakes in 
banks of other CEECs. For example, the Hungarian OTP bank acquired banks in Bulgaria 
and Slovakia, and the Latvian Parex bank took over Lithuanian AB Industrijos Bankas. 
Mian (2006) reports that there are significant distance constraints for foreign banks and 
finds that, as geographical distance between banks and host country increases, so do the 
information and agency costs. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that foreign banks tend 
to enter countries with more familiar culture and social customs, whose economic, political 
and social environments they know best.  
The entry of foreign owners into CEE banking markets has not always been so 
easy. In the beginning of the 90s, only few foreign banks entered the CEEC by establishing 
greenfield institutions. This was motivated by two factors: lack of support for foreign bank 
ownership in CEECs and the unattractiveness of these countries prior to structural reforms. 
The greenfield banks that were established followed foreign enterprises into CEECs and 
focused their operations on them. At the same time they searched the local markets for new 
opportunities. These greenfield banks grew rapidly in CEECs, and they acquired large do-
mestic banks as the privatization process got under way.  
Hungary 
The first country in CEECs to invite foreign strategic investors was Hungary. Until 1994 
foreign investors were limited to minority shares in Hungarian banks. The Hungarian 
banking sector, however, was suffering from loose budget constraints and moral hazard 
problems, stemming from repeated bank recapitalizations between 1993-1994. In order to 
improve banks' corporate governance and reduce fiscal costs of recapitalizations, a consen-
sus was reached in 1994 to privatize banks to strategic foreign investors. The process was 
completed by the end of 1997, when all the large banks were controlled by foreign owners. 
The only exception was OTP, the largest Hungarian savings bank, which was privatized 
                                                 
1 HVB 
Group is formally a German group, but it became the leader in CEEC banking market after the acquisi-
tion of Bank Austria Creditanstalt, an Austrian bank that had large presence in the CEEC. 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/ 2006 
 
  11 
via a public offering on the stock exchange to institutional investors, without a single ma-
jority owner.  
Baltic States 
The Baltic states have also been quick to invite foreign investors. However, foreign banks 
were able to gain strategic ownership here only after the Russian crisis in 1998. Banks in 
this region had large exposures to the Russian market and many banks experienced finan-
cial difficulties in the wake of the Russian crisis. For example, 10% of Latvian banks’ as-
sets were exposed to the Russian market with more than a third of this exposure being to 
the Russian GKO bonds. As a result, banks' liquidity was reduced, the interbank market 
dried up, and there was an outflow of non-resident deposits. Rigas Komercbanka, the coun-
try’s fifth largest bank, was subject to a bank run. It held 14% of its assets in Russia, and 
about 20% of its capital was owned by Russian investors. The bank was declared insolvent, 
along with a few other, smaller banks. Estonian and Lithuanian banks were less exposed to 
the Russian market, but nevertheless their profitability was affected. The crisis led to a 
consolidation of the banking markets and privatization of the remaining state banks. As a 
result of this restructuring, foreign banks, which were already present in the Baltic states, 
gained an even larger share of the local market. 
Balkan States 
Bulgaria and Romania have both been reluctant to privatize their banks to foreign strategic 
investors, and only the banking crises have induced them to rethink their strategies. Bul-
garia experienced a banking crisis in 1996-1997, and Romania in 1998-1999. The underly-
ing reasons for these were very similar: soft budget constraints, inadequate laws, and virtu-
ally unlimited liquidity flowing from central banks. In Bulgaria soft budget constrains led 
to a lending boom, but by 1995 roughly 75% of all bank loans were classified as nonper-
forming. Faced with this situation, the Bulgarian central bank provided liquidity, which 
ended in a currency and banking crisis. In 1997 the Bulgarian authorities finally embarked 
on privatization, and major Bulgarian banks were sold to foreign strategic investors. Before 
the crisis in Romania, large state owned banks were lending to inefficient state enterprises, 
and were quasi-automatically refinanced by the central bank. When the central bank de-
cided to discontinue this practice, many large banks experienced difficulties. After costly 
recapitalizations, the authorities began the privatization process with the active participa-
tion of foreign investors.   Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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Poland 
Poland did not incur large fiscal costs to support its banking sector, and this might have 
been one of the reasons why the political opposition to foreign bank ownership was very 
strong. Between 1992 and 1998 conditional licensing was applied to foreign banks, mean-
ing that a foreign bank could obtain a license only after agreeing to rehabilitate a distressed 
Polish bank. The privatization process started in 1993. Even though foreign investors were 
allowed to participate, they were entitled only to minority shares. Restrictions on foreign 
banks were removed in 1998 after the passing of new laws on banking, which were in line 
with EU legislation. The concept of privatization changed as well and the government be-
gan to seek reputable foreign banks in order to collect large privatization revenues. The 
high minimum capital requirement of ECU 5 million accelerated the involvement of for-
eign banks, since domestic banks could not raise such large amounts of money on the local 
market.  
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic decided to restructure its banking sector via voucher privatization. 
The mass privatization turned out to be a failure and the country suffered from one of the 
highest fiscal costs of bank restructuring (25.4% of GDP) in CEECs. In 1998, the govern-
ment sold its stake in Investicna a Postovna Banka (IPB) to the Japanese investor firm 
Nomura. This was the first time that a foreign investor had the opportunity to acquire a ma-
jority interest in a large Czech Bank. As the IPB was declared insolvent in 2000, the bene-
fits of foreign ownership became subject to doubt. However, the privatization to foreign 
investors continued. The Erste Bank and Société Générale acquired majority shares in 
large banks, but this happened only after the Czech government protected the new owners 
against the remaining credit risks on loan portfolios through a ring-fencing agreement. In 
2003, 85% of Czech banking capital was controlled by foreign investors. 
Slovak Republic 
The banking reform started late in Slovak Republic. Due to continuous political interfer-
ence into lending practices, banks accumulated a burdensome amount of non-performing 
loans. However, starting in 1999, reform accelerated, and major banks were recapitalized 
and sold to strategic foreign investors.  
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Slovenia 
In 2003, 32.5% of Slovenian bank capital was in the hands of foreign owners, a much 
lower ratio than in its CEE peers. Having started from a more favorable position than the 
other CEEC, Slovenia chose not to privatize banks and limit foreign competition. It should 
be mentioned that this strategy has proven effective as bank intermediation developed rap-
idly and no major banking crises occurred. However, competition between Slovenian 
banks has remained rather weak, and this led to a change in attitudes to foreign ownership. 
As a result, between 2001 and 2003, foreign investors increased their ownership of bank 
capital from 13% to 32.5%. 
 
 
3  Determinants of foreign bank profits: Literature overview 
 
It has long been observed that in developed countries foreign banks exhibit lower profit-
ability than their domestic competitors, whereas the reverse is true for transition econo-
mies.  Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) document lower returns on assets for foreign 
banks in the US, Canada, the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. De Young and 
Nolle (1996) analyze this phenomenon for the US market and find evidence that foreign 
banks sacrifice profits in exchange for larger market share. At the same time, Bonin et al. 
(2005) show that foreign banks in most of the transition countries enjoy higher profitability 
than domestic banks. However, Majnoni et al. (2003), in their study of the Hungarian 
banking market, underline that a majority of well-performing foreign institutions were cre-
ated as greenfield investments and so did not inherit problems related to an inefficient 
branch network, underdeveloped IT, and low-quality clientele. Chmielewski and Krzesniak 
(2003) show that foreign banks in Poland underperform domestic banks in terms of return 
on assets.  
The literature on determinants of bank profitability is very extensive, however the 
majority of papers focus on markets with low presence of foreign banks. Many recent stud-
ies take into account the large share of foreign banks’ assets in transition countries and in-
clude foreign ownership characteristic as one of the profitability determinants (Bonin et al., 
2005; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Majnoni et. al, 2003; Chmielewski and Krzes-
niak, 2003). However, most of these studies assume that profitability of domestic and for-
eign banks is influenced by the same factors. As a result, the analyses are performed on Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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pooled data. In reality, foreign banks are subject to two processes. Besides competing with 
domestic banks in their host countries they are part of multinational institutions and, there-
fore, can be affected by business conditions in their home countries and by strategy deci-
sions of their parent banks.  
The only studies that take into account international factors as profit determinants 
of foreign banks are the ones of Williams (1998a, 1998b, 2003), who tests a number of hy-
potheses concerning profitability of foreign banks in Australia. The results of these studies 
show that domestic factors add only a limited descriptive power to the model, albeit they 
offer important insights into foreign banks’ strategic and policy decisions (Williams, 
2003). Among international factors affecting foreign banks in Australia the most important 
are home-country GDP growth
2 (Williams, 2003) and home NIM (Williams, 1998a), 
which both have a positive impact on foreign banks’ profits in Australia. There is also lim-
ited support for the defensive expansion hypothesis, especially for the brief period after the 
opening of the Australian banking market to foreign bank entry. 
A number of papers investigate the relationship between assets growth and profit-
ability. It is natural to assume that an efficient bank would lower its prices, and thus gain 
additional market share, or it might choose to convert its superior efficiency into higher 
profits and forgo the opportunity for growth (Goddart et al., 2004). This is a particularly 
important issue for foreign banks that are interested in gaining a larger market share, and a 
few papers show that foreign banks in transition and developing countries exhibit higher 
and less volatile loan growth that continues even during crisis periods (de Haas and Lely-
veld, 2005; Goldberg et al., 2002).  
DeYoung and Nolle (1996) directly investigate the relationship between asset 
growth and profitability of foreign banks in the US and conclude that foreign banks might 
have placed growth ahead of profitability. The study shows that foreign banks do not suc-
ceed in developing a relationship with retail customers and therefore have to rely on ex-
pensive purchased funds. These results are also confirmed for the Australian market (Wil-
liams, 1998a, 1998b, 2003). Alternatively, Molyneux and Seth (1998) find that growth has 
a positive impact on profits of foreign banks in the US.  
                                                 
2 The literature on the relationship between home countries conditions and loan growth of foreign banks is 
much larger, but the evidence that it provides is ambiguous. Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Jeanneau and 
Micu (2002) document positive relationship between home country GDP growth and expansion abroad, 
whereas de Haas and Lelyveld (2005) provide prove to the contrary and show that when banks face problems 
at home, they try to diversify and expand abroad. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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In the analysis of foreign banks, it is important to take into account the transition 
period, which helps us understand whether higher/lower profitability of foreign banks is 
acquired or created. The most interesting study in this field is Berger et al. (2005). The au-
thors control for static, selection and dynamic effects of foreign ownership in Argentina 
and find that foreign banks select slightly less profitable institutions and do not improve 
their performance afterwards. Peek and Rosengren (1999) focus on the transition period of 
foreign bank subsidiaries in the US and attempt to explain their poor performance. Their 
results indicate that banks targeted by foreign acquirers exhibit lower profitability prior to 
acquisition, during the transition period, and in the long run after the change of ownership. 
Contrasting results are presented by Majnoni et al. (2003), which does not control for the 
years before the acquisition, but shows that the profitability of Hungarian banks increases 
in the first four years after acquisition by foreign investors and remains positive in the long 
run.  
De Haas and Naaborg (2005) present an interesting analysis of foreign banks in 
transition economies, which is based on focused interviews with managers of foreign par-
ent banks, their affiliates, and central bank officials in the CEEC. They document a number 
of channels through which the conditions in the home country could have an affect on the 
profitability of foreign subsidiaries. For example, the National Bank of Poland points out 
that due to the poor economic situation in Germany, some German banks were transferring 
subsidiaries’ profits to the German head office though extraordinarily high dividends. The 
Hungarian Central Bank mentions a scenario in which a foreign bank, due to problems in 
the home market, may not be willing to provide capital support to its subsidiary. Moreover, 
parent bank's increased risk premium may be translated into higher funding costs for the 
local subsidiaries.  
The literature on bank profitability is closely related to the literature on the deter-
minants of banks’ net interest margin (NIM). From a wide pool of work on this topic, one 
could single out a recent paper that compares NIM determinants for foreign and domestic 
banks. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) analyze the impact of the increased foreign bank 
ownership and the simultaneous increase in industry concentration on bank spreads for the 
South American countries. They find that foreign banks, in particular greenfield institu-
tions, charge lower interest margins. One of the most interesting findings of this study is 
that foreign and domestic banks react differently to the same market developments: greater 
market concentration widens spreads more for domestic than for foreign banks.  Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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4  Data 
 
In our study we use a sample of 265 banks from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the data ranges from 
1995 to 2003. All balance sheet and income statement data is taken from Bureau van 
Dijk’s BankScope database. We use unconsolidated statements whenever possible but rely 
on consolidated statements otherwise. We include in our sample commercial and savings 
banks but exclude investment banks, micro-finance banks and development banks. Merged 
banks are considered as two entities before merger and one entity after merger.  
In order to answer our research question, it is crucial to obtain the appropriate in-
formation on bank ownership (BankScope database lacks historical ownership data). For 
the years 1994-2001 we use the information kindly provided by de Haas and Lelyveld from 
de Nederlandsche Bank. We determined bank ownership for the two remaining years on 
the basis of banks’ official publications and central bank reports. For the whole investi-
gated period, a bank was considered foreign in a certain year if at least 51% of its capital 
was owned by foreign investors. We differentiate further between the two types of foreign 
ownership, namely takeover banks (i.e. institutions that were taken over by foreign banks) 
and greenfield banks (foreign banks that started operations as start-ups). 
In addition, we used the BankScope database to obtain financial information on 
parent banks. Due to a lack of historical information, we identified the largest investor in 
each case in the BankScope database and checked other sources (newspapers, banks’ an-
nual reports, central banks’ publications) for information on past changes of ownership. 
Here, we relied on consolidated balance sheets and income statements, since we are inter-
ested whether parent banks' financial health impacts subsidiaries in CEECs. The numbers 
of domestic, greenfield, and takeover banks in our sample are reported in Table 2. 
The data on macroeconomic variables was taken from the International Financial 
Statistics, indices of banking reforms in CEECs from the EBRD Transition Report, and 
stock market capitalization from national stock exchanges. We use macroeconomic data 
for all host countries as well as for home countries of foreign banks. A host country is de-
fined as a country where a bank is operating and the home country is the country of its par-
ent bank. We include the following home countries in our sample: Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Russia, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Since many parent banks are large multinational in-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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stitutions that operate beyond their home countries, we also decided to use an alternative 
definition of home area and to use macroeconomic data for the EU instead of individual 
home countries. 
We perform the necessary steps to ensure consistency of our dataset. First, we re-
move banks for which BankScope does not report any financial information. We also 
eliminate observations with the 1% smallest and largest values of return on assets and capi-
talization
3. As a result, we obtain a database with 1314 bank-year observations. Compari-
son with data published by the central banks of the respective CEEC reveals that our data-
set covers 84% of total banking assets on average. Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for 
our variables. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of ROA for banks of three types of ownership: 
domestic, takeover, and greenfield. The data is presented for each host country separately, 
and we show number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and p-value for t-test of 
equality of means. The results indicate that, on average, foreign banks are more profitable 
than domestic banks. However, the results are clearly driven by greenfield banks that enjoy 
ROA at least twice the size of that for domestic banks. Takeover banks also enjoy higher 
profits then domestic banks, but the t-statistic on equality of means does not show a sig-
nificant difference. Furthermore, the situation varies greatly across the countries. In Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia, both takeover and 
greenfield banks show higher ROA than do domestic banks. On the other hand, in Roma-
nia and Slovenia foreign banks' profits are not just lower than those for domestic banks; 
they are even negative.  
In Table 5 we show the profitability of foreign banks in CEECs and profitability of 
their parent banks in their home countries. Again we present calculations for each host 
country separately, and we show number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and p-
value for t-test of equality of means. The results indicate that it is very profitable for for-
eign banks to diversify into the Central and Eastern European banking markets, because 
their subsidiaries in these countries earn higher profits than the parent banks on their own. 
Again the situation is different across countries. While it is profitable to invest in most of 
the countries, in some countries, such as Lithuania and Romania, the profits of foreign 
banks are negative.  
                                                 
3 This step is motivated by quality of data. Some of the values of ROA and NIM were absurd and therefore 
we decided to trim the data in order to exclude unreasonable values of variables.  Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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5  Econometric methodology 
We proceed in two steps. To answer the first question “Did foreign banks acquire more or 
less profitable institutions in CEECs?”, we estimate a logit model with year_of_takeover as 
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with x denoting the vector of explanatory variables and α  the vector of coefficients. 
Therefore, the first model that we estimate is the following: 
 
+ × + + × + Λ = = ijt ijt ijt ijt cap h gr loan ROA takeover of year _ _ ( ) 1 _ _ Pr( 3 2 1 0 α α α α
+ × + × + × + × + × + × + jt jt jt jt jt jt EBRD credit irate h gdp h REER h 9 8 7 6 5 4 _ _ inf _ α α α α α α
) 13 12 11 10 jt jt ijt jt crisis HHI share stock × + × + × + × + α α α α    (3) 
where the variables are as explained in Table 6. 
 
  The estimation is performed on the pooled sample without fixed effects, because 
logit estimation with fixed effects would result in deletion of banks that have not been 
taken over4. Our sample includes all banks except greenfields because these, by definition, 
have never been acquired by foreign investors. Three models are estimated with dependent 
variables for year of takeover, year before takeover and two years before takeover.  
In order to answer the remaining four questions, we investigate the relationship be-
tween banks' return on assets and five groups of variables: a) individual banks’ characteris-
tics; b) host country macroeconomic conditions; c) indicators of bank market structure and 
development of the stock market; d) parent banks’ performance indicators; e) home coun-
try macroeconomic conditions. 
The baseline model that we test takes the following form: 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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jt jt ijt ijt ijt REER h cap h gr loan ROA × + × + × + × + = 4 3 2 1 0 inf _ _ _ β β β β β  
jt jt jt jt jt stock EBRD credit irate h gdp h × + × + × + × + × + 9 8 7 6 5 _ _ β β β β β  
ijt jt ijt jt ijt NIM p crisis foreign HHI share _ 14 13 12 11 10 × + × + × + × + × + β β β β β  
ijt ijt t j i ijt ijt ijt e irate p gdp p cap p ε γ µ η β β β + + + + + × + × + × + ' hom _ _ _ 17 16 15    (4)  
where the variables are as explained in Table 6. 
 
  Estimation of the above equation with an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach 
may be simple, but  would be deceiving in our case. Taking into account our data charac-
teristics, it is plausible to assume that the level of dependent variable varies consistently 
with the cross-section (i.e. bank), home/host country or time period. As a result, it is neces-
sary to use appropriate panel data techniques.   
The first step in our analysis is to ascertain the nature of bank-specific effects, that 
is to determine whether they are correlated with explanatory variables. This issue is very 
important as improper specification of individual effects can result in estimates that are bi-
ased and inconsistent. In order to determine the nature of individual effects, we perform a 
Hausman test
5. Its results indicate (for all specifications) that the individual effects are in-
deed correlated with independent variables. Hence, we choose a fixed effect model, con-
trolling for bank-specific effects. Additionally, in all specifications we include dummies 
that control for home country-, host country-, and time-specific effects.   
The next issue that we need to tackle is the possibility of heterogeneity and autocor-
relation in the error term. We perform two tests: a modified Wald test for group-wise het-
eroscedasticity and the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation. The statistics obtained 
indicate that both the variance of error terms is not constant across banks and that there is 
autocorrelation of order 1 (i.e. an AR1 process) in the residuals. Consequently, we choose 




                                                                                                                                                    
4 Since only 56 banks were taken over by foreign investors in our sample, the number of observations would 
shrink from 912 to 314. 
5 The values for Hausman tests are reported in the last line of Tables 9-10. Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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6  Empirical results 
In this section we attempt to answer the questions that we posed in the Introduction. 
 
  Did foreign banks acquire more or less profitable institutions? 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that takeover banks enjoy ROA of 0.51%, whereas 
domestic banks earn 0.45%. Therefore, the question that comes to mind is whether foreign 
banks earned their higher profitability or inherited it when they took over a bank. To an-
swer this question we run logit regressions. The results are presented in Table 7. We esti-
mate three models with dependent variables for year of takeover (first model), year before 
takeover (second model) and two years before takeover (third model).  
The estimations have low explanatory power and the significance of coefficients is 
not consistent for the three estimated models. However, it does allow us to draw conclu-
sions about institutions which were acquired by foreign investors. First of all, foreign in-
vestors looked for banks with large market share, as this variable is positive and strongly 
significant across all models. Second, we can conclude that timing of acquisitions was im-
portant, since domestic banks were acquired during economic downturns when their profit-
ability was low. This reflects the situation in some of the CEECs, where foreign banks 
were restricted in takeovers to failing institutions (Poland between 1993-1997) or were al-
lowed to enter only after the crises (Bulgaria and Romania). Interestingly, two years prior 
to takeovers, profitability of target banks was significantly higher than for banks that re-
mained domestic.   
Our next step is to investigate profit determinants separately for all, and individu-
ally for domestic, greenfield, and takeover banks. The results are presented in Table 8. 
There are two columns entitled All banks and in the first column we include a foreign 
dummy to analyze an effect of foreign ownership on ROA, as is usually done in the litera-
ture, and in the second column we include greenfield and takeover dummies to control for 
the entry mode of foreign banks. The results of these two regressions show that greenfield 
banks exhibit higher profitability than domestic banks, whereas the effect of the takeover 
dummy is not statistically significant. Among other profit determinants, we observe the 
positive effect of capitalization, inflation, GDP growth, market concentration and banking 
sector reform, whereas loan growth and capital market capitalization have all negative im-
pact on ROA. We can conclude that the higher profitability of greenfield banks that we no-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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ticed in the descriptive statistics (Table 4) does not disappear when we control for other 
profitability determinants
6. Our findings for all banks are broadly in line with the existing 
literature on profit determinants and therefore are not discussed here in detail.   
Further, the results are presented for domestic banks (column 3, Table 8) and for-
eign banks (column 4, Table 8). Moreover, we can now compare profitability determinants 
between greenfield banks (column 5, Table 8) and takeover banks (column 6, Table 8).  
 
  Are foreign and domestic banks affected in the same way by macroeconomic condi-
tions in their host countries? 
 
  One of the advantages of foreign bank ownership could be their smaller sensitivity 
to macroeconomic conditions in host countries. To test this hypothesis we included such 
variables as GDP growth, inflation, real interest rate, and change in real effective exchange 
rate (REER) in the host country.  
As expected, domestic banks react positively to business cycles and this effect is 
significant at the 1% level. In support of our hypothesis, foreign banks are not influenced 
by business cycles of their host countries. Moreover, GDP growth affects profitability of 
greenfield banks in a countercyclical manner: greenfield banks have higher ROA during 
economic downturns, and lower ROA during upswings. There could be a few possible rea-
sons for this. First, greenfield banks might charge higher interest rates during economic 
downturns to compensate for the increased risk, which would lead to higher profits, other 
things being equal (Martinez Peria and Moody., 2004). Second, they can use their loan loss 
provisions counter-cyclically, increasing them in good times and reducing them in bad 
times. Finally, greenfield banks might receive more support from parent banks during eco-
nomic downturns in host countries. This may be related to greenfield banks' strategy of 
building up market shares during economic downturns, when domestic banks usually re-
duce their lending (de Haas and Lelyveld, 2005).  
As to other macroeconomic variable, such as inflation, we also observe different re-
actions for domestic and foreign banks. Profits of domestic banks are not affected by infla-
                                                 
6 During the presentation at the National Bank of Poland, we were suggested that the higher profitability of 
greenfield institutions stems from the fact that they bring to the market a new product. As other banks follow 
them and also include this product into their services, the abnormal positive returns should disappear with 
time.  We tested this hypothesis by including an age variable for greenfield banks, but the results were not 
significant, indicating that the profitability did not change during the analyzed period.   Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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tion, whereas we observe a positive relationship between greenfield banks' ROA and infla-
tion. Our finding that profits of some banks react positively to inflation confirms other 
profitability studies, and it is a well-known fact that adroitly managed banks profit from 
inflation, due to the lag between the raising of their lending and deposit rates.  
All banks except greenfields react positively to changes in the REER. It was diffi-
cult to foresee the direction of this relationship from balance sheet analysis of banks, be-
cause the assets and liabilities in foreign currency were in proportion to each other in most 
countries. Since the data on maturity of these items was not available, and given that large 
parts of both assets and liabilities were denominated in foreign currencies, the real effect of 
currency fluctuations on profits was unpredictable (Baudino et al., 2004). In addition to 
this direct impact, banks may have suffered indirectly from exchange rate movements. 
During the period studied, most local currencies in our samples appreciated and this might 
have made it more difficult for exporting clients to repay loans, thus affecting banks’ prof-
its. As our results show, banks in CEECs benefited from appreciation of their currencies, 
suggesting that their foreign currency liabilities had longer maturity than assets
7. The rea-
son why greenfield banks are not influenced by exchange rate fluctuations can be attrib-
uted to the use of instruments for hedging against foreign exchange risk.  
 
  Are foreign banks sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in their home countries 
and to their parent banks’ financial situation? 
 
In order to answer this question we included in our econometric model characteris-
tics of parent banks and home countries of parent banks. Our findings show that foreign 
banks in CEECs are not sensitive to economic conditions in their home countries. Since the 
majority of foreign banks that are present in CEECs belong to multinational institutions 
that operate beyond their home countries, it would be better to include macroeconomic 
variables for the whole EU, rather than for individual countries. We perform this robust-
ness check, but still we do not observe any significant impact of home area macroeco-
nomic conditions on foreign banks’ performance (the results are available from authors 
upon request). It should be mentioned that Williams (2003) introduces home country GDP 
growth into his model and treats it as a proxy for an opportunity cost of accessing the host BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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nation. He finds a positive association between home GDP growth and foreign bank profits 
and interprets it as a substitution effect between international banking and multinational 
banking. This substitution occurs as a result of home GDP growth producing increased 
demand for offshore banking services that are serviced by the Australian subsidiary rather 
than by the parent. 
Concerning the financial situation of the parent banks, our findings show that 
greenfield banks are affected by strategies pursued by their parent banks. Specifically, we 
observe that greenfield banks in CEECs improve their profitability when their parent 
banks’ NIM goes down. This finding is contrary to the results of Williams (2003), who 
finds a positive relationship between ROA of foreign banks and NIM of their parent banks, 
explaining that only profitable banks can channel funds to their subsidiaries. However, low 
parent NIM can also result from a lack of profitable opportunities in the home market or a 
very competitive banking environment. Therefore, such banks may seek opportunities 
abroad, which would explain the negative coefficient of parent NIM in our regression. 
Such a finding is logical in light of statements of managers of international banks, who 
admit that they allocate capital to subsidiaries with the highest expected returns (de Haas 
and Naaborg, 2005). We also estimated our model with parent ROA as an explanatory 
variable, and the coefficient turned out to be positive, albeit not significant (the results are 
available from the authors upon request). This provides further support for our hypothesis 
that low NIM is a sign of tight competition and not of low profitability. 
 
  Does market concentration in host countries have the same impact on foreign and 
domestic banks?  
 
  The increase in foreign bank ownership in CEECs went hand in hand with the rise 
in banking market concentration. According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm, higher market concentration causes less competitive bank behavior
8 and leads to 
                                                                                                                                                    
7 As it was pointed to us by Iikka Korhonen, our results can be explained by the fact that exchange rate ap-
preciation is usually associated with many kinds of positive developments in the economy, eg higher credibil-
ity of economic policies, better institutions, etc.   
8 The relationship between market concentration and competition can be more complex. Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) estimate degree of competition in 50 developed and developing countries and demonstrate 
that more concentrated banking markets actually entail more competition than do less concentrated markets. 
Similarly, the number of banks is never significantly positively related to the competition indicator. Berger et 
al. (2004) offer a good review of current theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between bank 
concentration and competition. Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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higher bank profitability (see Gilbert, 1984, for a survey). In our study we would like to 
see whether there are differences in the way foreign and domestic banks react to higher 
market concentration or own market share. It is particularly interesting in our case, because 
the foreign ownership contributed to higher concentration of banking markets through two 
channels: 1) foreign banks acquiring a few domestic institutions and merging them into 
one; 2) domestic institutions consolidating because of competitive pressures from foreign 
peers.  
Similar to our previous findings, we observe differences in reactions of domestic 
and foreign banks. Domestic banks enjoy higher profits in more concentrated markets, in-
dicating that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm holds for them. At the same 
time, foreign banks do not seem to profit from these factors, and the results hold for take-
over and greenfield banks. Our results are in line with Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) 
who, in their study of foreign and domestic banks in Latin America, documented that 
greater market concentration widens spreads more for domestic banks than for foreign 
ones. The possible reason for this is that foreign banks charge lower interest rates in order 
to attract new customers and achieve the desired size. 
 
  How does the development of the stock market affect profits of foreign and domestic 
banks? 
 
Capital markets can perform a complementary or a substitution function for the 
banking sector. On the one hand, the Miller-Modigliani theorem states that debt and equity 
finance are pure substitutes in the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs. Therefore, we 
would expect to see a negative impact of deep stock markets on banks’ profits (substitution 
effect). On the other hand, as capital markets develop, banks get more information about 
clients, which facilitates the tasks of selecting and monitoring clients. Therefore, deep 
stock markets could help to mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard and 
increase banks’ profits (complementary effect). We test these hypotheses by including the 
measure of size of the national stock markets, while controlling for possible changes in the 
access to bank credit with indicators of the size of private credit market and EBRD index 
of banking sector reform. 
Our finding of a negative relationship between profits of all types of banks and 
stock market capitalization shows that the substitution effect dominates. The stock market BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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exerts competitive pressure on all banks and there is no significant difference in the reac-
tion for takeover, greenfield and domestic banks. This result is interesting since foreign 
banks, in particular greenfield institutions, are often accused of reducing loan supply to 
small and medium enterprises and of cherry picking the best customers. If this was the 
case, their profits would be the most affected by availability of alternative sources of fi-




7  Summary 
This paper contributes to the literature on benefits and costs of foreign bank ownership in 
transition economies. We investigate the determinants of banks’ profitability using a data-
set comprising 265 banks from 10 CEECs between 1995-2003. Since our interest is in the 
profitability determinants of banks with different ownership, we estimate the model for the 
whole sample and separately for the domestic, foreign, takeover, and greenfield banks. We 
study the relationship between banks’ return on assets and five groups of variables: a) indi-
vidual banks’ characteristics; b) host country macroeconomic conditions; c) indicators of 
bank market structure and development of stock markets; d) parent banks’ performance 
indicators; e) home country macroeconomic conditions for parent banks. 
Our findings show that greenfield banks perform better than domestic and takeover 
banks in terms of ROA. Interestingly, the profitability of takeover banks is not signifi-
cantly different from that of domestic banks. This finding is surprising in light of previous 
literature which shows that foreign banks possess superior technology and are better at 
mitigating risks. However, it should be mentioned that most of the literature on foreign 
bank ownership does not differentiate between mode of foreign bank entry – namely, 
greenfield and takeover banks. Our further analysis shows that relatively low profitability 
of takeover banks may reflect policy decisions of some countries to allow foreign bank en-
try only after crises, which resulted in foreign banks taking over less profitable institutions. 
We also find that it is profitable for international banks to open subsidiaries in transition 
economies, since in CEECs ROA for foreign banks significantly exceeds that for parent 
banks in home countries.  Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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Our findings indicate that foreign banks possess one very important advantage in 
comparison to domestic banks, namely their profits are not negatively affected by eco-
nomic downturns of their host countries. On the contrary, greenfield banks are able to in-
crease their profitability when GDP growth slows down in CEECs, enhancing banking sec-
tor stability. However, the reasons for this are not clear and there could be several explana-
tions for counter-cyclical behavior of banks’ profits. First, greenfield banks might charge 
higher interest rates during economic downturns, to compensate for higher risk, and this 
strategy would have an adverse effect on companies. Second, greenfield banks might re-
ceive extra financing from their parent companies during economic downturns, contribut-
ing to the stability of credit supply. It would be an interesting and important question for 
further analysis.  
One of the possible dangers of foreign bank ownership is the dependence of foreign 
institutions on the performance of their parent banks and their sensitivity to macroeco-
nomic conditions in their home countries. Our study does not find evidence to support 
these fears. To the contrary, our results indicate that foreign banks in CEECs do not react 
to changes in macro-environment in their home countries. However, parent banks seem to 
increase their financing of CEECs subsidiaries when their own margins shrink. This find-
ing is logical and is also confirmed by managers of international banks, who admit to allo-
cating capital to subsidiaries with the highest expected returns. 
The increase in foreign bank ownership in the CEEC went hand in hand with in-
creased banking market concentration. It is a well known fact that banks earn higher profits 
in more concentrated markets, which are usually associated with a less competitive envi-
ronment. Our results show that foreign banks' profits are not affected by market concentra-
tion, whereas domestic banks find it more profitable to operate in such markets. The possi-
ble reason for this is that foreign banks charge lower interest rates in order to attract new 
customers and achieve the desired size. 
Our paper shows that it is very important to analyze not only foreign and domestic 
banks separately, but also to distinguish between two modes of entry of foreign banks: es-
tablishing a greenfield institution, or taking over an existing domestic bank. Most of the 
literature on foreign banks ignores this division, but our study shows that greenfield and 
takeover banks react differently to the same factors. Of course, the present paper is not 
without the usual shortcomings. The most important drawback is the lack of possibilities to 
distinguish the channels through which various profitability determinants affect greenfield, BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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takeover and domestic banks. It would also be interesting to compare profitability determi-
nants of foreign banks in CEECs with those in other areas with high foreign bank presence, 
such as Latin America and Asia.  
 Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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Table 1. Market share (%) and total assets (in EURO) of major international banks in CEECs, 2003 
 Market share in each country (% of total country bank assets) 
 BG CZ  EE HU LT LV PL  RO SI  SK 
Total assets in CEECs 
(in EUR thousands) 
KBC Bank NV    25.48    10.2      5.24        30287910.3 
Erste Bank Sparkasse     25.88    6.77            24.26  28534848.9 
HVB Group  10.13  5.55    5.66  2.75    10.77  3.4  4.21  5.74  22196820.6 
Société Générale  4.01  19.18            15.2  7.51  0.43  19116304.9 
Unicredito Italiano  17.11  2.06          14.03  1.32    4.51  18746734.5 
Raiffeisen 5.13  3.86    5.9      1.96  7.94  2.35  20.97  14762549.2 
Citibank a.s.    2.94    2.58      7.58  3.14    3.05  12463970.1 
Banca Intesa SpA        7.58            22.28  8760961.68 
ING Bank NV  1.32      2.27      6.45        7932755.62 
Commerzbank AG        1.04      6.72        7410738.56 
Swedbank      62.8    28.82  17.5          6929075.57 
Allied Irish Banks plc              5.38        5478194.61 
Skandinaviska Enskilda       26.8    38.46  16.2          5248655.36 
Bayerische Landesbank        8.12              4413335.91 
Millennium               4.32        4399315.47 
GE Capital Bank     2.43    2.77              3358344.92 
Oesterreich. Volksbanken   14.45  0.80    1.08        0.98  1.30  3.17  2299759.63 
San Paolo IMI        1.41        0.44  5.65    2105390.66 
ABN AMRO Bank              0.75  5.65      1621319.39 
Deutsche Bank         0.56      1.28        1601328.95 
Crédit Lyonnais    0.85    0.89      0.28      0.87  1600961.57 
National Bank of Greece  10.94              1.18      1302810.6 
BNP Paribas  1.47      1.10      0.52        1275444.42 
Bank für Arbeit und Wirtsch.    0.59                3.22  1120549.06 
Gazprombank Group        2.01              1094768.34 
NORD/LB          12.43  4.04          1077680.99 
Fortis              1.02        1039485.02 
Credit Agricole        0.06      0.88        934484.246 
Nordea              0.90        917856.657 
WestLB         0.68      0.48        862762.533 
Rabobank               0.81        828800.036 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias                4.95      748297.926 
Sampo Bank Plc      7.67    3.80  0.46          726243.31 
DEXIA                    3.08  640902.475 
Alpha Bank              3.98        601215.733 
Dresdner Bank AG    0.78                  593741.997 
Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank AG                  1.60    360962.134 
Danske Bank A/S              0.28        281109.751 
United Gulf Bank            2.99          242900.302 
Korea Development Bank        0.41              222081.081 
DZ Bank AG              0.21        214696.949 
MDM Bank            2.5          203021.148 
Piraeus Bank                1.16      176008.215 
Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi               0.11        115168.412 
Emporiki Bank of Greece   0.51              0.36      106824.435 
Meinl Bank AG                    0.41  85684.1339 
GMAC Bank        0.07              40266.0618 
Bank of Moscow            0.39          31873.1118 
Egnatia Bank                0.18      27933.0444 
Total foreign assets   65.06  90.4  97.4  61.19  86.25  44.1  73.97  45.9  22.62  91.98   
Source : BankScope and authors’ calculations BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/ 2006 
 
  31 
Table 2. Number of greenfield, takeover and domestic banks in the sample for each country, 1995-2003 
    1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Bulgaria                     
 Greenfield      3  3  4  5  5  5  5 
 Takeover        1  3  5  7  8  10 
 Domestic 5  6  10  19  14  16  13  13  11 
 Total 5  6  13  23  21  26  25  26  26 
Czech Republic                   
 Greenfield 6  11  12  10  12  12  11  10  8 
 Takeover        2  2  3  5  6  6 
 Domestic 7  11  12  10  12  12  10  9  8 
 Total 13  22  24  22  26  27  26  25  22 
Estonia                     
 Greenfield                   
 Takeover          2  2  3  3  3 
 Domestic 7  9  11  4  2  3  2  3  4 
 Total 7  9  11  4  4  5  5  6  7 
Hungary                     
 Greenfield 5  12  14  12  17  17  12  13  13 
 Takeover    4  7  8  8  10  11  12  11 
 Domestic 7  10  10  7  8  9  9  7  7 
 Total 12  26  31  27  33  36  32  32  31 
Lithuania                     
 Greenfield                   
 Takeover          3  3  6  7  7 
 Domestic 2  2  10  10  6  6  3  2  2 
 Total 2  2  10  10  9  9  9  9  9 
Latvia                     
 Greenfield      1  1  1  1  2  2  2 
 Takeover      3  3  4  4  5  5  5 
 Domestic 5  10  19  17  15  15  12  14  14 
 Total 5  10  23  21  20  20  19  21  21 
Poland                     
 Greenfield 2  9  11  12  12  10  12  12  11 
 Takeover    1  4  5  7  11  14  14  14 
 Domestic 20  29  28  23  24  19  15  13  12 
 Total 22  39  43  40  43  40  41  39  37 
Romania                     
 Greenfield 1    1  7  9  8  8  9  9 
 Takeover        1  2  2  4  5  8 
 Domestic 4  3  5  12  12  15  13  12  9 
 Total 5  3  6  20  23  25  25  26  26 
Slovenia                     
 Greenfield 2  4  5  4  4  4  4  4  4 
 Takeover        1  1  1  1  2  2 
 Domestic 6  14  23  15  15  15  13  10  11 
 Total 8  18  28  20  20  20  18  16  17 
Slovakia                     
 Greenfield 1  6  8  8  7  8  6  6  6 
 Takeover    1  1  2  2  2  5  7  8 
 Domestic 3  9  9  8  8  9  6  4  3 
 Total 4  16  18  18  17  19  17  17  17 
Total    83  151  207  205  216  227  217  217  213 
Source: authors’ calculations. Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of variables 
 Roa  Loan growth  Capital  Host inflation  REER  Private credit  Stock market 
               
loan growth  -0.0455
*  1.0000            
 0.1046             
                            
capital  0.1954
*** 0.0701
***  1.0000          
 0.0000 0.0124           
                            
host inflation  0.0857
***  -0.0028  0.0615
***  1.0000        
 0.0022 0.9216 0.0284         
                            
reer  0.0298 0.0155 0.0245 0.1563
***  1.0000      
 0.2889 0.5815 0.3820 0.0000       
                            
private credit  -0.0297  0.0408  -0.3176
*** -0.1185
*** -0.1117
***  1.0000    
 0.2895 0.1461 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001     
                            
stock market  -0.1228
***  0.0311  -0.3144
*** -0.1488
***  -0.0183  0.4926
***  1.0000  
 0.0000 0.2673 0.0000 0.0000 0.5140 0.0000   
                            
share  0.0749
***  -0.0177  -0.0960
***  0.0021 0.0009 -0.0389  0.0471
* 
 0.0075 0.5288 0.0006 0.9396 0.9753 0.1661 0.0934 
                            
HHI -0.0329  0.0121  0.0538
** 0.1150
***  -0.0340  -0.0594
** 0.1151
*** 
 0.2409 0.6661 0.0551 0.0000 0.2261 0.0343 0.0000 
                            
EBRD  0.0550






 0.0499 0.1212 0.0000 0.0000 0.0696 0.0000 0.0000 
                            






 0.3630 0.7756 0.0063 0.0000 0.0152 0.0000 0.0007 
                            
host interest rate  -0.0519
*  0.0435 -0.0136  -0.6361
*** -0.3264
***  0.0430  0.1893
*** 
 0.0645 0.1206 0.6279 0.0000 0.0000 0.1252 0.0000 
                            
crisis 0.0177  0.0827
***  -0.0397  0.1843
***  -0.0114  0.2909
*** 0.1173
***  
 0.5288 0.0032 0.1568 0.0000 0.6833 0.0000 0.0000 
                            
foreign  0.1004
***  0.0279  -0.0232 -0.0356 -0.0450 0.1025
*** 0.1900
***  
 0.0003 0.3208 0.4093 0.2050 0.1090 0.0003 0.0000 
                            
greenfield  0.1265
***  0.0429 0.0062 0.0057 0.0052 0.1401
*** 0.1319
***  
 0.0000 0.1264 0.8261 0.8397 0.8536 0.0000 0.0000 
                            
takeover  -0.0635
**  -0.0071 0.0272  -0.0161 0.0387  -0.0857
***  -0.0161  
 0.0235 0.8016 0.3324 0.5668 0.1678 0.0022 0.5663 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
The table presents correlation coefficients and p-values (below). 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 share HHI  EBRD  host  gdp  host  interest 
rate 
crisis Foreign  greenfield 
                 
share 1.0000                 
                 
                              
HHI  0.3822
***  1.0000              
 0.0000               
                              
EBRD -0.0329  -0.2341
***  1.0000            
 0.2412 0.0000             
                              
host gdp  0.0278  -0.1222
*** 0.1389
***  1.0000          
 0.3214 0.0000 0.0000           
                              
host interest rate  -0.0785
*** -0.0902
***  0.0276 -0.0019  1.0000         
 0.0051 0.0013 0.3249 0.9467         
                              




***  1.0000      
 0.6958 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       






***  -0.0204 1.0000     
 0.0131 0.0000 0.0000 0.0471 0.0011 0.4662     








***   1.0000  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0233 0.0224 0.0000   
                              
takeover  0.1038
*** 0.0556




 0.0002 0.0473 0.2232 0.6883 0.7817 0.0321 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
The table presents correlation coefficients and p-values (below).Olena Havrylchyk and Emilia Jurzyk 
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Table 4. ROA summary statistics across countries for domestic, takeover, and greenfield banks 
  O b s   M e a n   S E   p  
B G        
  Domestic    107  .6558566 .2829711  
  Takeover 34  1.454849 .2518847 0.1285
1) 
  Greenfield  31  .6938736 .5527204 0.9499
2) 
C Z        
  Domestic   91  -.5750697 .3040346   
 Takeover  24  .5741756
*  .1385942 0.0572 
 Greenfield  92  .6921108
***  .0819694 0.0001 
E E        
  Domestic    45  .5181833 .3577561  
 Takeover  13  1.988132
**  .4150511 0.0415 
H U        
  Domestic    74  .3601863 .3733726  
  Takeover 71  .645355  .2614683 0.5356 
 Greenfield  117  1.338424
***  .1797593 0.0094 
L T        
  Domestic    43  .0716656 .4323982  
  Takeover 26  .1032947 .3850739 0.9603 
L V        
  Domestic    121  .4463572 .3413123  
  Takeover 29  .2353111 .5803292 0.7798 
 Greenfield  11  -.0749772  1.032353  0.6579 
P L        
  Domestic    183  .9150912 .1581944  
  Takeover 70  .608775  .1605317 0.2656 
 Greenfield  92  1.013181  .212223  0.7158 
R O        
  Domestic    85  .1464177 .4669642  
 Takeover  22  -2.253989
**  1.286483 0.0352 
 Greenfield  53  1.359179
*  .2994528 0.0592 
S I        
  Domestic    122  .9818168 .0945078  
 Takeover  8  -.2025359
***  .6308978 0.0037 
 Greenfield  35  .5784625
*  .1979756 0.0518 
S K        
  Domestic   59  -.6027444 .3899188   
  Takeover 28  .1523465 .3145403 0.2171 
 Greenfield  56  1.444385
***  .1807485 0.0000 
A l l          
  Domestic  930  0.4471487 0.0943517  
  Takeover  325  0.5124488 0.1284826 0.7062 
 Greenfield  487  1.041758
***  0.0854614 0.000 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
1) p-value represents the result of t-test on equality of means between domestic and takeover banks 
2) p-value represents the result of t-test on equality of means between domestic and greenfield banks  
***    significant at    1% 
**        significant at 5%    
*       significant at 10%BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 5. ROA summary statistics across countries for foreign banks in CEECs and their parent banks 
  Obs  Mean  SE  P 
B G        
 foreign  41  1.292071  0.2728769   
 parent  41  0.5854339** 0.1718999  0.03711) 
C Z        
  foreign  95  0.6265304 0.0746778  
 parent  95  0.434994**  0.0418511 0.0194 
E E        
 foreign  13  1.988132  0.4150511   
 parent  13  0.5709944***  0.0504242 0.0045 
H U        
 foreign  138  1.019599  0.1497359   
 parent  138  0.273358***  0.1083372 0.0001 
L T        
 foreign  16  -0.4189024  0.5848849   
 parent  16  0.6338209*  0.1126193 0.0938 
L V        
  foreign  37  0.1594823 0.5377949  
 parent  37  1.04959  0.2513095  0.1208 
P L        
  foreign  134  0.8201421 0.1245334  
 parent  134  0.397583***  0.0378949 0.0012 
R O        
 foreign  57  -0.209271  0.582619   
  parent  57  0.7302416 0.1338082 0.1109 
S I        
 foreign  39  0.369124  0.2162902   
  parent  39  0.3672993 0.0386734 0.9936 
S K        
 foreign  78  1.073234  0.16756   
 parent  78  0.4983467***  0.0654325 0.0064   
      
All  countries       
  foreign  bank  648  0.7612859 0.0788324  
 parent  bank  648  0.4790887***  0.0334284 0.001 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
1) p-value represents the  result of t-test on equality of means between parent and foreign banks 
***    significant at    1% 
**      significant at 5%    
*                significant at 10% 
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Table 6. Definitions of variables 
Symbol Description  Source of data 
year_of_takeoverijt  dummy variable taking the value 1 only in year t if bank i was acquired by foreign 
investor in year t 
De Haas & Lelyveld + 
own research 
ROAijt  return on assets of bank i in host country j in year t, calculated as ratio of profit 
after taxes to total assets 
BankScope 
loan_grijt  real rate of growth of total loans of bank i in country j in year t  BankScope 
h_capijt  capitalization of bank i in host country j in year t, calculated as a ratio of registered 
capital to total assets 
BankScope 
h_infjt  rate of inflation in host country j in year t  IFS 
REERjt   change in real effective exchange rate in host country j in year t  IFS 
h_gdpjt  real rate of growth of GDP in host country j in year t  IFS 
h_iratejt  real short-term interest rate in host country j in year t  IFS 
creditjt  ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP in host country j in year t  BSCEE 
EBRDjt  EBRD index of banking sector reforms in host country j in year t  EBRD transition report 
stockjt  ratio of stock market capitalization  to GDP in host country j in year t  National stock exchanges 
sharejt  share of assets of bank i in host country j in year t in total assets of banking sector 
in host country j in year t 
BankScope 
HHIjt  Herfindahl index in host country j in year t, calculated as the sum of squared shares 
of assets 
BankScope 
foreignijt  dummy variable taking the value 1 if bank i in host country j in year t was owned 
by a foreign institution 
De Haas & Lelyveld + 
own research 
takeoverijt  dummy variable taking the value 1 in year t and consecutive years if bank i was 
acquired by foreign investor in year t 
De Haas & Lelyveld + 
own research 
greenfieldijt  dummy variable taking the value 1 in year t and consecutive years if bank i was 
established by foreign investor in year t 
De Haas & Lelyveld + 
own research 
crisisjt  dummy variable taking the value 1 if country experiences a banking crisis or re-
capitalization of banks 
Caprio & Klingebiel 
p_NIMijt  net interest margin of parent bank in year t, calculated as a ratio of the difference 
between interest income and interest expenses to total assets  
BankScope 
p_capijt  capitalization of parent bank of the bank i in country j in year t calculated as a ratio 
of registered capital to total assets 
BankScope 
p_gdpijt  real rate of growth of GDP in home country of the bank i in country j in year t  IFS 
p_irateijt  real short-term interest rate in home country of bank i in country j in year t  IFS 
ηi  dummy variable taking the value 1 for each bank i   
µj  dummy variable taking the value 1 for each host country j   
γt  dummy variable taking the value 1 for each time period t   
home’ijt  a vector of dummy variables taking the value of 1 if parent banks comes from coun-
try home, which includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, UK, and US 
BankScope + own re-
search 
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 Table 7. Estimation results for logit model. 
 
year_of_takeover  Year of takeover  One year before takeover  Two years 
 before takeover 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ROA  -0.096
**  -0.069  0.111
* 
 (0.050)  (0.061)  (0.058) 
loan growth  -0.001  0.0003
***  -0.007
** 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
host inflation  -0.026
**  -0.007  -0.008
** 
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.004) 
REER 0.032  0.009  -0.08
** 
 (0.02)  (0.032)  (0.036) 




 (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
stock market  -0.007  0.046
**  0.032 
 (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
host GDP  -0.127
*  0.018  -0.144
* 
 (0.074)  (0.05)  (0.088) 
host interest rate  -0.0002  -0.028  -0.076
** 
 (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.037) 
EBRD -0.039  -0.87
*  -0.788 
 (0.597)  (0.468)  (0.848) 
HHI 0.974  -1.298  -3.685 
 (1.424)  (1.776)  (3.574) 
crisis -1.52  0.058  0.789 





 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
cons -1.213  0.099  1.627 
 (1.651)  (1.42)  (2.548) 
       
Number of obs.  912  714  517 
Log likelihood  -197.03  -170.71  -117.56 
Pseudo R2  0.064  0.058  0.082 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Dependent variable is takeover, which takes the value 1 if a bank was acquired by a foreign owner, and 0 otherwise. 
Greenfield banks are excluded from the  estimation. 
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  Table 8. Panel estimation of determinants of banks’ ROA with individual home country macro variables 
 All  banks  All banks  Domestic   Foreign   Greenfield   Takeover  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
loan growth  -0.00004***  -0.00004*** -0.0003***  -0.00003*** -0.00003***  0.0004 
  0.000005  0.000005 0.0001  0.000003 0.000003  0.0009 
capital  0.096*** 0.096***  0.122***  0.041*  0.047**  0.010 
  0.022  0.022 0.035  0.023 0.019  0.071 
host inflation  0.005** 0.004**  0.002  0.007*** 0.007***  -0.127 
  0.002  0.002 0.002  0.001 0.001  0.160 
REER  0.028*** 0.028***  0.051***  0.021**  -0.001  0.079** 
  0.010  0.010 0.020  0.011 0.011  0.034 
host GDP  0.078** 0.077**  0.121***  -0.037  -0.091*  0.202 
  0.030  0.030 0.045  0.051 0.047  0.138 
host  interest  rate  0.002  0.001 0.0001  0.014 0.015  -0.023 
  0.014  0.014 0.020  0.016 0.014  0.083 
credit private   0.021* 0.021*  -0.001  0.023*  0.011 0.010 
  0.011  0.011 0.020  0.013 0.011  0.028 
EBRD  1.531*** 1.545***  1.784***  1.094*  0.329  3.202** 
  0.439  0.439 0.674  0.574 0.415  1.533 
stock market   -0.045*** -0.046***  -0.062***  -0.039**  -0.031**  -0.094** 
  0.013  0.013 0.023  0.016 0.016  0.042 
share -0.019  -0.019  -0.027  -0.157*  -0.017 -0.232 
  0.029  0.029 0.040  0.088 0.068  0.192 
HHI  6.352*** 6.379***  7.878***  3.184 -0.949  19.973 
  2.382  2.384 3.022  4.270 3.067  14.105 
foreign 0.263           
 0.255           
greenfield   3.296         
   2.065         
takeover   0.254         
   0.255         
parent NIM        -0.413* -0.363*** -0.674 
        0.237 0.141  0.567 
parent capital        -0.028 0.081  -0.104 
        0.083 0.060  0.140 
parent GDP        0.026 0.052  -0.037 
        0.054 0.072  0.120 
parent int. rate        -0.007 -0.005  0.010 
        0.026 0.055  0.029 
crisis 0.614  0.581  0.989*  0.509     
 0.418  0.417  0.514  0.596     
crisis*takeover   0.192  0.238        1.910 
 0.507  0.505        1.359 
crisis*greenfield   0.106  0.267    -0.604 0.035   
 0.450  0.450    0.641 0.246   
Observations  1270  1270  688 582  358 224 
R
2  0.16  0.15 0.16  0.27 0.37  0.42 
Hausman  test  61.36  66.88 64.14  43.04 52.64  39.14 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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